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COMMENTS
CONSIDERATION IN SURETYSHIP CONTRACTS
IN WASHINGTON
RICHARD W. BARTKE

"Suretyship is the relation which exists where one person has undertaken an obligation and another person is also under an obligation or
other duty to the obligee, who is entitled to but one performance, and
as between the two who are bound, one rather than the other should
perform."' The suretyship relation is a specialized form of contract
and in order to be enforceable must satisfy all the requirements of
contract formation, one of which is consideration.' If this were always
kept in mind and the cases analysed on the basis of technical contract
rules, much of the difficulties and confusion found in the area would
disappear. However, because of the tripartite nature of the suretyship transaction and of the circumstance that, at least historically, the
surety generally did not derive any direct economic benefit from the
transaction, lending his name and credit for reasons of blood ties or
friendship, the basic nature of the transaction was often lost sight of
by courts. This is most noticeable in the consideration area. Since
people usually bargain for economic goods or services, which is almost
invariably true of the principal contract in the suretyship situation,
many cases tend to equate direct economic benefit with the technical
concept of consideration. An example taken at random may illustrate.
The court was construing the offer of a "gratuitous" surety and
expressed the canon of construction, that the offers and contracts of
"gratuitous" sureties will be construed strictly, in the following language: "The appellant received no considerationfor guaranteeingthe
payment of the indebtedness of Walder & Company. That the contract of a guarantorwithout compensation will be strictly construed,
needs no sustaining citation of authority."3 (emphasis supplied) Here,
in two sentences, the court treated considerationand compensation as
synonymous and interchangeable. Because of this recurring error in
I ESTATEMENT, SECURT § 82 (1941) ; comment (g) to this section reads in part as
follows: "The term 'guaranty' is used in this Restatement as a synonym for suretyship.
'Guarantor' is used as a synonym for surety. 'Guarantee' is used as a verb meaning to
assume a suretyship obligation." The Restatement terminology is used throughout this
article.
2 Thompson v. Moe, 147 Wash. 133, 265 Pac. 457 (1928) ; Universal C.I.T. Credit

Corp. v. DeLisle, 147 Wash. Dec. 283, 287 P.2d 302 (1955).
3

Hansen Service, Inc. v. Lumn, 155 Wash. 182,283 Pac. 695 (1930).
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analysis the discussion will begin with a brief survey of the concept
of consideration.
CONSIDERATION

The American Law Institute defines consideration as follows:
(1) Consideration for a promise is (a) an act other than a promise,
or (b) a forbearance, or (c) the creation, modification or destruction
of a legal relation, or (d) a return promise, bargainedfor and given in
exchange for the promise.
(2) Considerationmay be given to the promisor or to some other

4
person. It may be given by the promisee or by some other person.
(emphasis supplied)

This definition has been adopted by the Washington court.5 This
definition clearly indicates the dual nature of consideration as being
either a benefit to the promisor, or a detriment to the promisee. This
dual character is the result of the development of modem contract
law from the common law actions of debt and assumpsit. The action
of debt, which was from the beginning contractual in nature and
required a quid pro quo as one of its elements, produced the benefit
aspect of consideration. The action of assumpsit which was delictual
in origin, being first a form of the action on the case for deceit, gave
us the detriment aspect of consideration.' Eventually, for procedural
reasons, both these grounds supported an action of assumpsit, one
being the basis of indebitatus assumpsit and the other of special
assumpsit. 7 The final step in the creation of modem contract law, and

development of the concept of consideration, was the enforcement of
mutual promises.8 Relatively early in this development, the concept
of suretyship was recognized, as courts began to enforce promises to
pay debts of others, where in reliance on such promises, and to their
4 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §

75 (1932).

5Johnson v. S. L. Savidge, Inc., 43 Wn2d 273, 260 P.2d 1088 (1953) ; Snyder v.
Roberts, 45 Wn.2d 865, 278 P.2d 348 (1955).
6Ames, The History of Assutmpsit, 2 HARv.L. REv. 1 (1888-9) ; Holdsworth, Debt,
Assumpsit, and Consideration,21 MicHi. L. REV. 347 (1912-3) ; HOLMS,THE COMMON
LAw c. VII and especially pp. 284-88 (1881) ; 1 Wn.LUxsToN, CONTRACTS § 99 (rev. ed.
1936) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 109 et. seq. (1950).
7 Ames, Parol Contracts Prior to Assumpsit, 8 -ARv. L. Rxv. 252, 264 (1894-5)
"Assumpsit would lie both where the plaintiff had incurred a detriment upon the faith
of the defendant's promise, and where the defendant had received a benefit. Debt would
lie 8only in the latter class of cases.."
Holdsworth, Debt, Assumpsit, and Consideration, 21 Micni. L. REv. 347, 350
(1912-3) "It was not till the middle of the sixteenth century that the judges began to
incline to the belief that, if a promise were made for a promise, both promises could be
enforced by action of Assumpsit; and it was not till the end of the century that the
principle was accepted as settled law."
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detriment, promisees parted with goods or money.9 "From that day to
this a detriment has always been deemed a valid consideration for a
promise if incurred at the promisor's request."1
PRINCIPAL AND SURETYSHIP CONTRACTS EXECUTED
CONTEMPORANEOUSLY

The simplest situation, analytically, is presented where the principal
and the suretyship contracts are executed at the same time. This is
also the most common situation. Somewhere during the bargaining
process it becomes obvious that the creditor will not part with his
goods or money or will not execute some other kind of agreement,
e.g. a construction or employment contract, unless security, in addition
to the principal's promise, is given. At such stage a surety offers to
pay in case of default by the principal. If the creditor accepts and in
reliance on the surety's offer parts with his goods or money, or executes
the contemplated contract, the surety is bound since, "the same consideration will support an indefinite number of promises so long as they
are made upon the faith thereof."" (emphasis supplied) This is
simply the application of detriment consideration and has been
repeatedly recognized by the Washington court. Thus in an action
against the indorser of a note which, for the purposes of the decision,
the court treated as non-negotiable, the defendant contended that he
was not liable since no part of the consideration moved to him. The
court answered that, ".... the rule is, in case of a surety, that the consideration which moves to the principal is sufficient to sustain the
obligation of the surety."'"
This principle was most strikingly illustrated in Pacific National
Bank of Tacoma v. Aetna Indemnity Co." The plaintiff bank would
not advance money without security. The defendant, a compensated,
professional surety, executed a bond which was delivered to the plaintiff who advanced the money. Unknown to the plaintiff the principal
never paid the premium. Upon the principal's default, the surety disclaimed liability. The court properly held that the extension of credit
supported both the principal's and the surety's promises. Since the
9 Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv.L. REv. 1, 14 (1888-9) "It was accordingly decided, in 1520, that one who sold goods to a third person on the faith of the
defendant's promise that the price should be paid, might have an action on the case
upon the promise. This decision introduced the whole law of parol guaranty" Citing

Y. B. 12 Hen. VIII 11, pl. 3.

10 Id. at p. 14; See also I CoRmIN, CONTRACTS § 121 (1950).
" BRITTON, BILLS & NoTEs § 93 (1943) ; See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 83

(1932).
12 Farmers State Bank v. Gray, 94 Wash. 431, 162 Pac. 531 (1917).
13 33 Wash. 428, 74 Pac. 590 (1903).
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payment of the premium was not made an express condition precedent
of the surety's duty, its nonpayment was not available as a defense.
The same principle was applied in a long line of cases. One of these
involved a bond executed by a vendor of real property to save the
vendee harmless from a judgment foreclosing a lien against the land,
which the vendor was about to appeal. The vendor failed to perfect
his appeal and was held liable. 4 Others involved an action on a bond
given to secure the performance of a construction contract, where the
contract itself did not call for security, but where the owner refused
to sign and execute the agreement unless a bond were furnished;'" the
case of a butcher who supplied a logging camp on credit;" of a bank
president who promised to deliver to the plaintiff collateral security
in consideration of advances to the bank; 17 and of an indemnitor who,
in consideration of the plaintiff becoming surety for a third party,
promised to hold her harmless as to half the amount. 8 Similarly the
compromise of a cause of action against a corporation was consideration for the corporation's as well as for the surety's promise." Occasionally Statute of Frauds problems may also involve consideration
questions."0
The consideration moving from the creditor to the principal will
support not only the surety's promise as to future, but also as to
existing indebtedness. 2 Since the surety's promise is aleatory, the
question of the sufficiency of the consideration is not apt to arise.
The court has also held that a recital in a bond that the creditor
refused to make advances unless security were given and that the
14 Frank v. Jenkins, 11 Wash. 611, 40 Pac. 220 (1895).

15 Sweeney v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 34 Wash. 126, 74 Pac. 1057 (1904).
16 Schoening v. Maple Valley Lumber Co., 61 Wash. 332, 112 Pac. 381 (1910).
17 Noyes v. Adams, 76 Wash. 412, 136 Pac. 696 (1913) (The plaintiff in this case did
not recover as she failed to prove any damages.)
18 Abrahamson v. Burnett, 157 Wash. 668, 290 Pac. 228 (1930).
1"Hobson v. Marsh, 69 Wash. 326, 124 Pac. 912 (1912) (A corporation sold overissued shares to a bona fide purchaser in violation of the statute, which gave rise to a
cause of action against it. The purchaser surrendered the shares to the corporation and
in settlement of his claim accepted the corporation's note indorsed by the defendant.)
20 Backus v. Feeks, 71 Wash. 508, 129 Pac. 86 (1913)
(The defendants were sureties
on a bond given to secure the performance by the lessee under a five year lease; the
lease was not acknowledged as required by statute and thus unenforceable otherwise
than as a lease from month to month. The court held that the defense of the Statute
of Frauds was not available to the sureties and said that there was consideration for
their promise. The whole discussion is not very satisfactory and fails to give any workable theory for the solution of these problems.)
21 W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Langeland, 145 Wash. 525, 261 Pac. 93 (1927) (One
Larsen was distributing the plaintiff's products in Washington. The plaintiff would
not renew his contract unless security were given. In consideration of the execution of
the renewal contract and extension of future credit, the defendants guaranteed Larsen's
past and future indebtedness.)
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surety was interested in the principal contract, imparted prima facie
consideration and shifted the burden of proof to the surety, to prove
lack of consideration." In this case the surety failed to sustain the
burden.
However, as mentioned above, in some cases the court failed to
distinguish between motive which induced the surety to guarantee the
principal's performance, direct economic benefit to the surety, and the
technical concept of consideration. Thus in Washington Grocery Co.
v. Citizens' Bank of Anacortes," the defendant bank made a loan to
one McLean who with the proceeds purchased a grocery business,
giving the defendant a chattel mortgage. In order to enable McLean
to make credit purchases from the plaintiff, the defendant executed a
continuing offer of guaranty contemplating a series of contracts. The
plaintiff accepted by extension of credit and upon McLean's default
the court properly held the defendant liable. However, the court's
reasoning is questionable; it said,
The contention that the guaranty was without consideration is fully
answered by the fact that the appellant furnished all the money for the
purchase of the grocery store, held a mortgage upon the
same and was
24
interested in seeing the business properly conducted.
While the court was undoubtedly right that these were the motives
which prompted the defendant to undertake its suretyship obligation,
such motives are legally entirely irrelevant. The consideration was
not the defendant's desire to protect its investment, but the detriment
to the plaintiff which parted with its goods in reliance upon the defendant's promise. The court has in several other cases tried to find some
incidental benefits to the defendant sureties and called them consideration.25
There is one more case in this group which requires analysis, not
because it is important, but because it is so clearly wrong and because
it so well illustrates the result of a failure to distinguish between the
concept of consideration and direct economic benefit. 5 A street railway company applied to the plaintiff city for a franchise to construct
a line. The city granted the franchise under the conditions that the
construction would be completed and operation of the line started
22 German-American Mercantile Bank v. Illinois Surety Co., 99 Wash. 9, 168 Pac.
772 (1917).
23 132 Wash. 244, 231 Pac. 780 (1925).
24 132 Wash. at 247, 231 Pac. at 781 (1925).
25 Moore v. Kildall, 111 Wash. 504, 191 Pac. 394 (1920) ; A. M. Castle & Co. v.
Public Service Underwriters, 198 Wash. 576, 89 P2d 506 (1939).
26 City of Aberdeen v. Honey, 8 Wash. 251, 35 Pac. 1097 (1894).
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within a stated period and that a bond with sureties would be posted.
The defendants became sureties on the bond. Upon the principal's
default the city sued the sureties. The court, reversing the trial court,
held the defendants not liable saying,
There was no consideration running to the obligors in the bond for
the reason that no franchise had been granted to them, and they, as
individuals, would have had no right to construct any street railway
under the franchise granted to the Pacific Wheless Electric Railway
Company,
it not appearing that the franchise had been assigned to
27
them.

This case was never cited in any Washington case, but had it been
followed, it would have meant the end of suretyship transations in
this jurisdiction. The holding of the court is not entirely clear since
in the next paragraph it is said that the plaintiff city could not prevail
since it failed to prove any damages; the question of damages being
entirely irrelevant if there was no obligation in the first place. At any
rate it would be desirable if this case were formally overruled as it
may confuse a reader who happens to find it.
SURETYSHIP CONTRACTS EXECUTED SUBSEQUENT

TO THE PRINCIPAL

CONTRACT

The analytically more difficult and also more often litigated situation
is that of a suretyship undertaking executed subsequent to the execution of the principal contract." The simplest situation is presented
where there is a new and independent consideration for the surety's
promise; the most common being the extension of time on the principal's matured obligation, 9 or forbearance to enforce a claim against
278 Wash. at 253, 35 Pac. at 1097 (1894).

28 See Annotation 167 A.L.R. 1174 (1947) and also short Annotations in 74 A.L.R.
1097
2 9 (1931) and 124 A.L.R. 717 (1940).
Rattelmiller v. Stone, 28 Wash. 104, 68 Pac. 168 (1902) (The plaintiff deposited a
sum of money with a savings bank and received a certificate of deposit payable one year
after date. At maturity the certificate was extended for six months and on the back the
defendant's intestate, an officer of the bank signed a guaranty.) Pitt v. Little, 58 Wash.
355, 108 Pac. 941 (1910) (The defendant was president of a corporation indebted to the
plaintiff. The debt was overdue. In consideration of the extension of the time of payment the defendant executed the note in issue.) J. R. Watkins Co. v. Brund, 160 Wash.
183, 294 Pac. 1024 (1931) (Brund had a sales territory for the plaintiff's products. His
debts to the plaintiff were past due and one of the sureties on his bond died; the plaintiff
requested a new bond. Brund induced one Buerkli to sign the bond promising not to
deliver it until he obtained the signature of the surviving surety on the original bond.
However, he got the signature of a financially irresponsible person and delivered the
bond, the plaintiff notifying Buerkli of acceptance. The plaintiff extended Brund's
time of payment and granted new credit, as well as released the sureties on the original
bond. Buerkli was held liable, the court finding consideration in the extension of time,
granting of credit and release of sureties. The last ground is clearly wrong, as Buerkli
did not bargain for it, especially since one of the discharged sureties was to be his
co-surety.)
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the principal." In the analytical process the requirements of mutual
assent must be watched to make sure that the extension of time or
forbearance were the bargained for equivalents. In this connection a
very misleading statement by Brandt that forbearance without a
promise to forbear is not enough, that there must be a promise for a
promise,"' must be discussed, because it was quoted with approval by
the court in Cowles Publishing Co. v. McMann." If the surety's offer
calls for a promise and the creditor simply forbears, the surety is not
liable not because forbearance cannot be consideration, but because
there was no mutual assent and the surety's offer was never accepted.
On the other hand if the surety's offer is one for a unilaterial contract
and calls for forbearance and the creditor in fact forbears, the offer is
accepted and the surety is liable. The Washington court has so held in
F. C. Palmer & Co. v. Chaffee 3 which is not mentioned in the McMann
case. While some may feel that mere forbearance is a poor bargain,
it has been often said that courts do not make new contracts for
the parties, and having received what he bargained for there is no
reason why the surety should not be liable according to the tenor of
his undertaking.
Of course, extension of time is not the only thing sureties have bargained for. Thus there was consideration where a bond was given to
secure to a partnership the exclusive possession of a stock of goods
from a wrongfully appointed receiver; where an assignor guaranteed
the payment of a conditional sales contract the assignee crediting the
assignor's account with the contract; and for the release of the
vendee's ship upon which the vendor had loaded machinery and which
it would not let depart unless security were given."8 Similarly, guaranties
executed in consideration of a credit of overdue interestIT and in order
30 Ekre v. Cain, 66 Wash. 659, 120 Pac. 523 (1912) (The guaranty was executed to
avoid the notoriety of a lawsuit.) State Bank of Clarkston v. Morrison, 85 Wash. 182,
147 Pac. 875 (1915) (The defendant guaranteed the note involved in consideration of
the bank's forbearance to sue on the note.) F. C. Palmer & Co. v. Chaffee, 129 Wash.
408, 225 Pac. 65 (1924) (The defendant's tenant was indebted to the plaintiff, with part
secured by a chattel mortgage upon farm machinery. The plaintiff threatened to fore-

close the mortgage and the defendant wrote that if it would forbear to enforce its claim
until a certain date he would guarantee the payment.) Puget Sound National Bank of
Tacoma v. Olsen, 174 Wash. 200, 24 P.2d 613 (1933) (Guaranty executed by shareholder and officer in consideration of forbearance to sue on overdue notes of a corporation.)

31 1 BRANDT, StupTysHn' & GUARANTY § 25 (3rd ed. 1905).
32 25 Wn.2d 736, 172 P.2d 235 (1946).
33 Supra, note 30. See also Essig v. Turner, 60 Wash. 175, 110 Pac. 998 (1910).
84 Larsen v. Winder, 20 Wash. 419, 55 Pac. 563, (1898).
3
5 W. W. Kimball Co. v. Cockrell, 23 Wash. 529, 63 Pac. 228 (1900).
8
6 Washington Iron Works v. McNaught, 35 Wash. 10, 76 Pac. 301 (1904).
37 Skagit State Bank v. Moody, 86 Wash. 286, 150 Pac. 425 (1915).
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to secure to the principal part of a contract price prior to the time of
performance38 were supported by consideration.
Of course, it is possible to have a formally executed contract, which
does not become binding until the happening of some condition,39
and such a condition may consist of the promise of a surety. 0 This
has been recognized in several Washington cases.4 '
The two most recent Washington cases in this area deserve special
attention. The first is the by now well-known case of Cowles Publishing Co. v. McMann.4 2 One Baker executed a contract with the plaintiff publishing company, whereby he was to distribute the "Spokesman Review" in a certain area. The contract called for a bond with
sureties. Since the regular distribution of the paper was imperative to
the plaintiff, Baker at once entered upon performance. The bond was
executed some time later; the exact date was in dispute. At the time
of the execution of the main contract the identity of the sureties was
'8 Thompson v. Moe, 147 Wash. 133, 265 Pac. 457 (1928) (The plaintiff contractedto buy a house and lot from the defendant; the purchase price to be paid partly in cash
and partly by the assumption of a mortgage. A small down payment was made, the balance to be paid on completion. The defendant requested the plaintiff to advance him
some money which the plaintiff agreed to do if he were given security to hold him
harmless from possible mechanics' liens. The co-defendant bonding company executed
a bond. Later the defendant requested more money and delivered a second bond executed
by the co-defendant. The plaintiff put the money in escrow and later used it to discharge liens. The bonding company was liable on the first, but not on the second bond,
since it bargained for a cash payment to the principal, which he never received.)
3) Pym. v. Campbell, 6 El. & Bl. 379 (Q.B. 1856). However, see criticism of the
rationale of this opinion in 3 CoariN, CoNTRAcrs § 589 (1951).
40 See Annotation 167 A.L.R. at 1185 (1947).
41 DeMattos v. Jordan, 15 Wash. 378, 46 Pac. 402 (1896) (Action against sureties on
construction bond. The bond was dated May 1, but was acknowledged on May 8 and
the evidence tended to show that it was in fact executed on that date. The contractor
had already started preliminary work. The court held the sureties liable on two
grounds: that the giving of the bond was one of the inducements to the plaintiff, and
that the executed duplicate original of the construction contract was delivered to the
contractor upon the delivery of the bond indicating that the contract was not binding
until that moment.) Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Packard, 75 Wash. 178, 134 Pac.
812 (1913) (The plaintiff agreed to become surety on a construction bond if the defendants would indemnify it; the defendants executed a bond which did not satisfy the plaintiff. Some three months later they executed a second bond. The defendants were held
liable either because the suretyship undertaking did not become final until the indemnity
bond was executed, or because the two were part of the same transaction.) Tomanovich v. Casey, 106 Wash. 642, 180 Pac. 919 (1919) (The plaintiff was a foreigner who
could not speak or read English and the defendant was an attorney who handled a case
for him and whom he implicity trusted. The defendant's brother and another approached
the plaintiff for a loan, which the plaintiff would not make unless the defendant
approved. The defendant prepared a note which was subsequently extended. Later the
defendant gave the plaintiff a check for a small sum and a note for the balance, which
was not signed by the defendant's brother; the plaintiff believed that both instruments
were checks. When he discovered his mistake he approached another attorney. Negotiations ensued and the defendant wrote a six month guaranty on the back of the note.
The court held the defendant liable saying that the note did not take effect until the
guaranty was executed. The case could probably have been decided on the ground
that2the forbearance of the plaintiff to sue at the time constituted consideration.)
4 Supra, note 32. Noted in 22 WAsH. L. Rxv. 142 (1947).
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not ascertained. The distributorship contract gave the plaintiff the
right to terminate it if Baker were in arrears; Baker in fact was never
out of the "red." In the action on the bond the court affirmed a judgment for the defendants holding that there was no consideration for
their undertaking and saying,
A review of the cases makes it apparent that the rule contended for
by appellant has been limited in its application to situations where at
the time the principal obligation is entered into: (1) the guarantor
has offered or promised the debtor to guarantee the debt for him, and
the debtor communicated this information to the creditor, who executed
the principal contract in reliance thereon; (2) or the guarantor makes
such promise direct to the creditor with the same result; (3) or the
debtor gives the creditor an assurance that, if he later deems the debt
insecure, he might look to a certain person, then named by the debtor
to guarantee the debt.43 (emphasis supplied)
Points I and 2 above are undoubtedly correct since the sureties bargained for the principal contract and although their promises were
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, they were voidable, not
void, and became binding when reduced to writing.
However, the court's third point, that the surety will be liable if
named by the principal even though he was ignorant of the fact, is
more than questionable. Since the gist of the concept of consideration,
as shown above, is the bargained for act, forbearance or promise, it is
difficult to see how somebody who was ignorant of the negotiations
could have bargained for the result. The fact that his name had been
given to the creditor does not change the situation; being ignorant of
the transaction, he could not take part in the bargaining process. The
incongruity of the court's position prompted the author of a note in
the Washington & Lee Law Review to argue that no legal distinction
should be made between a surety whose name was disclosed to the
creditor, although without his knowledge or consent, and one who was
not named.," While this writer agrees that it would make more sense
48 25 Wn2d at 740, 172 P2d at 238 (1946). This passage is quoted and adopted in
SIMpsoN, SURETYSHIP § 26 (1950).
444 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 221, 226

(1946-7) "There seems to be no logical or legal
reason for the difference in holding liable one person who subsequently signs a guaranty
agreement without any new consideration because he was named, albeit without authorization, by the principal debtor at the time the principal contract was executed, and in
not holding liable another person similarly situated merely because he was not named
by the debtor when the principal contract was executed. In both situations the debtor
has agreed to procure a surety acceptable to the creditor. In neither situation did the
person who later made the guaranty make any promise to the creditor at the time the
creditor entered into the principal contract; nor can the creditor have any right against
either of the third persons until he actually makes the guaranty.... In both cases the
creditor acts in consideration of a prospective promise of a third party; and the fact
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to hold the surety liable in either case, if an exception to or a deviation
from the doctrine of consideration must be made, it is the opinion of
this writer that the holding of the case is wrong on orthodox contract
principles.
It is the opinion of this writer that the sureties in the McMann case
should have been held liable on a constructive conditions analysis;
after all, our modern doctrine of constructive conditions was first
announced in a case involving the question of giving of security.45
Since at the time of the execution of the suretyship undertaking the
major portion of the distributorship contract was still executory, the
furnishing of a satisfactory bond with sureties should have been construed as a constructive condition precedent to the continued duty
of immediate performance on the part of the plaintiff publishing company. Thus construed, the happening of the condition becomes the
bargained for equivalent and all the difficulties disappear, as there is
ample consideration to support the suretyship undertaking."
While it is submitted that the above analysis will work satisfactorily where the principal contract is wholly or partly executory, it
will not solve the problem where the creditor has fully performed; e.g.
where the creditor has parted with the goods or money, the subject
matter of the exchange, in reliance on the principal's promises to pay
in the future and to supply sureties as security. Under the above
analysis the creditor could have refused to perform until the bargained
for security was forthcoming, but of course it was competent for him
to waive a condition of his own promissory duty. However, it is submitted that even in such a case the surety should be held liable. The
only satisfactory approach to the problem found by this writer, is that
suggested by Professor Williston, who would use the concept of novation for the purpose; it may be added parenthetically that the learned
author cites no case authority for his position, primarily perhaps
because courts have failed so far to develop a comprehensive theory
covering this type of case. Professor Williston says,
Even in such a case [the creditor relied upon the debtor's promise to
provide a surety] the surety should be held. His promise is taken by
that this party is named in one case and not in the other should not afford any legal
distinction between the cases." (Italics are by the writer of the quoted note.)
45 Kingston v. Preston, 2 Doug. 689 (K.B. 1773) (The defendant contracted to transfer to the plaintiff, at a certain time, his business with the entire inventory, for which
the plaintiff promised to pay in agreed installments and to furnish good and sufficient
security. The plaintiff failed to supply the security and the defendant refused to transfer
his business. Lord Mansfield held that the giving of security was a condition precedent
to the defendant's duty of immediate performance.)
46 See RESTATEmIENT, CONTRACTS § 266 (2) (1932).
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way of novation in satisfaction of the principaldebtor's promise to proside a surety. There is no greater difficulty in such a novation than in
any case where a promisee accepts the promise of a new obligor in lieu
of the promise of the previous one.47 (emphasis supplied)
In this situation the consideration bargained for by the surety is the
discharge of the principal from one of his promissory duties.
The fallacy of the position taken by the court in the McMann case,
that forbearance without a promise to forbear cannot be a consideration, has been discussed above.
The most recent case involving the problems here under discussion
is Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. DeLisle." The facts of this case
are briefly these. A corporation engaged in the business of selling cars,
executed on March 25, 1952 a contract with the plaintiff finance company, whereby it (the plaintiff) agreed to finance the dealer's car
purchases. The dealer in turn was to assign to the finance company
the conditional sales contracts whenever it sold a car. The financial
condition of the dealer corporation deteriorated steadily and on June
20, 1952 the defendants, who were officers and principal shareholders
of the dealer corporation, executed to the plaintiff finance company
an offer of guaranty. The offer recited that the offerors requested the
plaintiff to continue to extend credit to the dealer corporation and
continue to accept assignments of commercial paper from it and to
forbear for any period of time to strictly enforce the obligations of the
dealer corporation. In consideration thereof the offerors promised to
guarantee the payment of all sums due or to become due from the
dealer corporation. The plaintiff continued to extend credit until Febrary, 1954, when the dealer corporation became insolvent. The
plaintiff sued the sureties, alleging the execution of the principal contract, the financial position of the principal (dealer corporation), the
execution of the offer of the guaranty and its acceptance by continued
extension of credit. The plaintiff was nonsuited in the trial court on the
ground that there was no consideration for the defendants' undertaking
and the order of dismissal was affirmed on appeal, the court saying,
Yet, beyond the bare fact of a benefit or detriment or, more specifically,
the extension of further credit, it is fundamental that such must arise
out of an agreement between the parties. There must be a meeting of
the minds. In the instant case, the testimony is that appellant, in order
to continue the account, secured the guaranty from respondent through
its representative in Lewiston. There is not one word of testimony
476 WILLISTON, CONTRACT S § 1874 (rev. ed. 1938).
48 Supra, note 2.
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that respondent executed the guaranty in order that further credit be
extended to the motor company. There is nothing in the written guaranty itself to indicate that it was given in considerationof the extension
of further credit. Appellant has failed to prove that the guaranty was
supported by an independent consideration."9 (emphasis supplied)
The above statement, especially the italicized part, is rather startling.
It seems to assume that the writing was executed as an acceptance of
an offer to extend further credit, when in fact it is quite clear from the
writing itself that it was an offer, parts of which read as follows,
Each of us request you to extend credit to, make advances under
wholesale floor plan arrangements or otherwise, purchase notes, conditional sale contracts, [etc.] ... and to induce you to so do and in consideration thereof and of the benefits to accrue to each of us therefrom,
each of us as a primary obligor jointly and severally and unconditionally guarantees to you.., that Dealer will fully, promptly and faithfully
perform.. .0 (emphasis supplied)
This is the typical language of an offer and it is an offer for a unilateral contract, since it calls for an act (extension of credit, etc.) rather
than for a promise to extend credit, etc. At the time of the execution
of this offer by the defendants there was obviously no contract, as the
offer had not yet been accepted. When in reliance thereon the plaintiff
extended further credit, this act was both the acceptance of the offer,
in the precise terms of the offer, and also the consideration for the
defendants' promise. The case presents an example of faulty mutual
assent analysis.
Of course, we may have an antecedent duty"' problem here.
There was in existence a principal contract and if the plaintiff was
under an unconditional duty to continue extending credit, etc., then
there was no consideration for the sureties' promise. If this were the
basis of the decision the court should have said so. No part of the
principal contract is set out in the opinion and we may only speculate,
but it is usual for finance companies to insert in such contracts clauses
whereby they may terminate their duties after a given date or when
they feel insecure due to the debtor's deteriorating financial condition.
If the principal contract in the DeLisle case had such a clause, the
continued extension of credit for over a year and a half would have
been ample consideration.
49 147 Wash. Dec. at 287, 287 P.2d at 304 (1955).
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51 See RESTATEMENT, CoNTRcATS § 76 (a) (1932) adopted in Queen City Construc-

tion Co. v. Seattle, 3 Wn.2d 6, 99 P.2d 407 (1940); also 1 CORBIN, CoNmAcrs § 171
(1950).
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The case also repeats the statement of the McMann case discussed
above, which thus acquires new dignity by repetition.
BILLS AD NOTES-AccommODATION PARTIES

Negotiable instruments present one of the commonest areas in which
suretyship transactions take place. Accommodation parties, whether
they are makers, acceptors or indorsers, satisfy all the requirements
of a surety as found in the Restatement of Security and thus are
sureties.52 Most of the rules governing negotiable paper are found in
the Negotiable Instruments Law, but consideration is not defined in
the statute. Neither does section 29"' help in the solution of these
problems. The requirements of the enforceability of the undertaking of
an accommodation party, as far as consideration is concerned, are the
same as in any other kind of suretyship contract. Thus if the accommodation party becomes such prior to the delivery of the instrument,
the consideration supporting the instrument will also support the
promise of the surety.5 Where the accommodation party becomes such
subsequent to delivery, but his promise is supported by a new consideration, e.g. extension of the time of payment or taking of a renewal
note, his obligation is binding. 8 Also if the accommodation party
promises to become such prior to the delivery of the instrument, but
signs subsequently, he is liable.5
Prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law there was
a good deal of confusion as to the nature of an accommodation party,
the court purporting to make a distinction between a surety and an
accommodation indorser, which, however, was never explained." These
cases seem to be of historical interest only, as the cases subsequent to
52

BRITTON,

BILLS & NOTS § 93 (1943) ; RESTATEmENT,

SEcuRITY

§ 82 comment (k)

(1941).
53 N.I.L. § 25 (RCW 62.01.025) This section does not define consideration, but value
for purposes of due course holding analysis. Since value is defined in terms of consideration, to consider this section as defining consideration would be to run in a circle. See
4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1146 (rev. ed. 1936).
54 N.I.L. § 29 (RCW 62.01.029) ; see discussion of this section in BRITTON, BILLS &
NOTES § 93 (1943) ; for an attempted clarification of the issues see UCC § 3-415.
55 Mfallette v. Pohlman Investment Co., 179 Wash. 654, 38 P.2d 357 (1934).
6 Katz v. Judd, 108 Wash. 557, 185 Pac. 613 (1919) (Extension of time) ; Pierce v.
Lowenthal, 161 Wash. 336, 295 Pac. 1021 (1931) (Renewal note).
57 Dittmar v. Frye, 200 Wash. 451, 460, 93 P2d 709, 713 (1939). The court said, "If
at the time the loan was made it was the understanding-that situation not only reasonably may have existed but very probably did exist-that the additional signature of
appellant would be obtained, and if it was placed on the note February 11, 1931, by
appellant pursuant to the original agreement, that signing related back to the inception
of the original contract of October 31, 1930, and no new consideration was necessary."
58 Weeks v. Bussell, 8 Wash. 440, 36 Pac. 265 (1894) ; Allen v. Chambers, 13 Wash.
327, 43 Pac. 57 (1895).
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the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law do not repeat this
statement.
In those early days it was settled that an accommodation indorser,
who became such prior to the delivery of the instrument, was liable,
the consideration for the instrument supporting his undertaking
as well." Also it was settled, that an accommodation maker was
not liable to the payee for whose accommodation the instrument was
made."
CONCLUSION

Our law libraries are bursting with books of decided cases and our
digests and other aids to research tend to subdivide fields in finer and
smaller segments. While this is inevitable and a case "on all fours" is
a godsend to the busy practitioner, such development presents the
danger of atomization of the law. The solution of all suretyship problems on the authority of suretyship cases tends to obscure the fact
that the problem is basically one of contract law. This process, if
carried far enough, will result in the creation of a new branch of the
law, unconnected to any other. Thus the "seamless webb" of the common law is in danger of being torn to shreds. Our constitution enjoins
upon us a "frequent recurrence to fundamental principles;"'" this
reminder is as salutory in the field of contracts as it is in constitutional law. In concrete terms of the subject under discussion this means
that cases should be argued and decided more on the basis of analysis
of mutual assent and consideration problems, unhampered by the fact
that the contract litigated is one of suretyship, than on the authority of
holdings or dicta (after all the whole celebrated passage in the
McMann case is a dictum) in isolated suretryship cases. It is with the
hope that it may in some small measure assist in an overall reappraisal
of this area, that this article was written.
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a' WAsn. CONST. art. I, § 32.

